Aristotle Contra Fatalism
Reconstructing Aristotle's refutation of logical fatalism.
In De Interpretatione, Aristotle intends to refute a particular argument for fatalism: the logical argument. Another argument for fatalism is the metaphysical one. The former relies on the principle of bivalence and the latter on causal determinism to contend that the future, like the present and past, is fixed: immutable; unchangeable. Simply put, the Fatalists adopt these two modes of argumentation to assert that whatever is to occur in the future necessarily occurs in the manner it does. In this essay, I will demonstrate that Aristotle successfully responds to the logical fatalist argument by revealing its reliance on the fallacy of division. I will also deny that Aristotle suggests rejecting the principle of bivalence to refute the fatalist position. However, Aristotle’s challenge to the metaphysical argument, if extent whatsoever, does not amount to a sufficient refutation thereof, despite its rhetorical persuasiveness. I will conclude by showing that Aristotle must successfully respond to both arguments for fatalism because, if either one obtains, his ethical framework is nullified, thereby disqualifying a significant component of his overall philosophical framework. Aristotle conclusively refutes the logical fatalists’ claims; his brief exposition of his metaphysical commitments portends potential responses to the causal determinism of the metaphysical fatalists.
To begin, what exactly is the argument employed by the logical fatalists To answer this question, we must first understand the principle of bivalence. Bivalence holds that every proposition—that is, the meaning expressed by a sentence—possess a truth value: True or False. Take, for example, the sentence, “Jack has a younger brother.” This sentence is True because I—the “Jack” in question (not to be confused with one of however many million homonymous Jacks there are on the planet)—do, as a matter of fact, have a brother, Ben, who is two years younger than me. The reality of my having a younger brother necessitates the truth0valkue of the aforementioned sentence, which we shall denote as F, being True. However, this sentence is not necessarily true without qualification; the state of the world—a different world—could be such that my parents did not have more children after my own birth. Bb contrast, a sentence that is necessarily True without qualification, F’, would be the following: “It is either the case that Jack has a younger brother or it is not the case that Jack has a younger brother.” We can decompose this truth-functional compound sentence into its individual sentential components: “It is the case that Jack has a younger brother,” call this p; and “it is not the case that Jack has a younger brother,” call this ¬p. The original truth-functional compound sentence, F’, can then be rewritten as “p v ¬p”. Since p, some proposition, is always either True or False (per the principle of bivalence), we know that “p v ¬p” is necessarily true without qualification (always).
A simple truth-value table is demonstrative:
This table shows that, for all truth-value assignments of p (and, therefore, ¬p), “p v ¬p” is always True. Importantly, the unqualified truth of this composite proposition is so whether it describes something in the past (fixed), present (fixed), or future (open).
Now that we understand the principle of bivalence and what it entails for propositions, we can turn to the logical fatalist argument. In De Interpretatione, Aristotle describes the logical fatalists’ position with the famous example of a future naval battle: “It is the case that there will be a naval battle tomorrow or it is not the case that there will be a naval battle tomorrow” (paraphrased). Call this truth-functional compound sentence G, and the two propositions of this logical disjunction q and ¬q. Like F’, G is True necessarily and without qualification. Because of G’s unqualifiedly necessary truth, the logical fatalists contend that the future is fixed because, whether you know q or ¬q is True, it is the case that one is so in the present, and so the future state is known in advance (hence, immutable). Therefore, the fatalists claim that the principle of bivalence entails the fixity of future events through its entailment of truth-value assignments of propositions concerning the future in the present (and past).
Aristotle wants to resist this conclusion because, if the future is indeed fixed, one cannot choose her actions; if one cannot choose her actions, her actions cannot be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy because, by Aristotle’s own lights, these are qualities that pertain exclusively to chosen actions. If the future is fixed, no action is chosen; all are pre-determined. Therefore, in order to save Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle must refute logical fatalism. To do this, Aristotle has two options: reject the principle of bivalence or, accepting the truth of bivalence, reject the inference of bivalence to fatalism. Despite arguments to the contrary, Aristotle opts for the second strategy.
Evidence that Aristotle does not go down the first path abound in De Interpretatione. For example: “In the case of what is and what has been, then, it is necessary that the affirmation or negation be true or false. And in the case of universal statements about universals it is always necessary for one to be true and the other false; and the same is true in the case of particulars, as we have said.”[1] In this passage, Aristotle takes pains to make explicit his commitment to the principle of bivalence; regarding statements about universals (that are universal) and particulars, Aristotle says that the affirmation must be either True or False, as we’ve described earlier. Later on, Aristotle labels the argument rejecting bivalence for propositions about the future as a “mistaken reply.”[2] Yet, denying the principle of bivalence seems intuitive, prima facie, and an expedient way to do away with the troublesome conclusion of logical fatalism. Why doesn’t Aristotle take up this strategy? A reductio ad absurdum shows the glaring error in rejecting the principle of bivalence for events, irrespective of their location in time (past, present, or future). Let’s assign the disjuncts q and ¬q indeterminate truth-values because of their description of a future state of affairs. This entails some unacceptable conclusions about the logical disjunction, G, formed therefrom. Namely, we can no longer say that G’s is necessarily true without qualification despite it taking the same logical form as F’, whose Truth we have demonstrated.
Instead, Aristotle clearly goes down the more fruitful path, i.e., the path by which Aristotle reveals the logical fatalists’ participation in the fallacy of division: “[O]ne cannot divide <the contradictories> and say that one or the other is necessary. I mean that, for instance, it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea battle tomorrow, but it is not necessary for a sea battle to happen tomorrow, nor is it <necessary> for one not to happen. It is necessary, however, for it either to happen or not to happen.”[3]
So much for Aristotle’s supposedly golden prose. Anyway, how can we unpack Aristotle’s intuitive and conclusive logical argument above? Using sentential logic instead of natural language will be helpful. Aristotle assents to the unqualifiedly necessary truth of “q v ¬q”, as demanded by the principle of bivalence. What he disputes is the logical fatalists’ inference from the Truth (or Falsity) of this disjunction, G, to a supposedly necessary Truth (or Falsity) of “q” or “¬q.” To make this inference would be to commit the fallacy of division. Returning to our earlier example, F’, helps us understand that there is no unqualified necessity in the truth-assignments of p and ¬p; p is necessarily True because it is a matter of fact that I have a younger brother (Ben) and so ¬p is, correspondingly, necessarily False—but not without qualification; the qualification is that p obtains in this universe. By contrast, In all universes, “p v ¬p” and “q v ¬q” are True, but “p” and “q” are only ever necessarily True or False conditional on the particular Universe of Discourse we happen to occupy.
So much then for the logical fatalist account; Aristotle succeeds in demonstrating that the jump from the principle of bivalence to the fixity of the future, based on the supposed unqualified necessary truth-value assignments of the propositions of a disjunction, does not obtain.
The fatalists have another argument in their arsenal, however: causal determinism, a.k.a., metaphysical fatalism. The metaphysical fatalists argue thusly: Event C is caused by Event B is caused by Event A and so on such that all events in the future necessarily follow from past ones, like a long line of dominoes. And likewise with present and past events following from antecedent ones. Again, this picture of the fixity of past, present, and future problematizes Aristotle’s ethics insofar as its truth precludes meaningful choice—free will—of human beings. If metaphysical fatalism obtains, then human beings are robbed of their agency and status as moral agents.
By appealing to intuition and his own metaphysical stipulations about mankind, Aristotle proffers the grounds upon which to formulate a challenge to this second species of fatalism: “[W]e see that both deliberation and action originate things that will be; . . . It is possible, for instance, for. This cloak to be cut up, though <in fact> it will not be cut up but will wear out instead.”[4] That is, it is genuinely within the power of the cloak-wearer to choose (qua not-necessitated-by-antecedent-events) to shred his cloak (or not). In this way, Aristotle demonstrates that causal determinism necessitates the rejection of free will, which he believes most people will regard as being “surely. . . impossible.”[5] Unbelievable, certainly; impossible, Aristotle does not demonstrate. Therefore, if one is willing to bite the no-free-will bullet (and deny all sense-perception reports of their own agency) implied by the metaphysical fatalist argument, fatalism can still obtain.
In any event, Aristotle is successful on several grounds: He establishes the independence of the principle of bivalence from logical fatalism, enabling him to hold onto the former and reject the latter, whose cogency depends upon the former. Still, the fatalists retain one of the two arrows in their quiver: the metaphysical argument.
Bibliography:
Aristotle. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine. Selections. Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub., 1995.
[1] De Interpretatione, Book 9, 18a28-31.
[2] De Interpretatione, Book 9, 18b17.
[3] De Interpretatione, Book 9, 19a30-33.
[4] De Interpretatione, Book 9, 19a8-14.
[5] De Interpretatione, Book 9, 19a8.