Deontology > Virtue Ethics?
Theory of right action is a critical desideratum of any ethical theory. One which virtue ethics appears to lack.
What follows is my lightly edited response to a discussion board on chapters 3 and 4 of Julia Annas’s Intelligent Virtue:
[Esteemed classmate], you rightly point out that Annas's concept of "rightness" is parasitic on moral worthiness. To Annas, being virtuous isn't doing what's right; rightness is doing that which the virtuous person would do. On page 41, Annas states this explicitly by reference to Rosalind Hursthouse's account: "an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous person would characteristically (acting in character) do." Annas's own solution is to "recognize 'right'. . . as a weak notion, which does not introduce independent ethical force itself. . ."
I agree with Annas that the word "right" has two meanings, one duty-bearing ("barely acceptable", p. 42), the other supererogatory ("exemplary", p. 42), but I don't agree that the first understanding is “thin” or trivial. The first understanding prescribes what one may do. I believe this is an important—perhaps the most important—desideratum of an ethical theory, considering we are social animals who punish each other for performing those actions we consider to be impermissible, i.e., not right: wrong. So, for Annas to give short shrift to theory of right action is to discard a key component from her theory.
While, in practice, I agree with you that permissibility is "itself is dependent on the acceptance of the cultural and temporal audience," it ought not be. That is to say, the moral fact of slavery's impermissibility was always true, irrespective of time, place, and culture. Annas entertains this instance of wrong action explicitly on pages 45 and 46. She says that, while a Roman may do the (nominally) right thing by treating his slaves humanely, he is not virtuous because "a truly virtuous person. . . could not stand to others in the unjust master-slave relation." I agree wholeheartedly with this last claim, but—wait a minute—what does Annas mean by the "unjust master-slave relation" (p. 46)? Annas seems to be invoking a theory of right action that the master-slave relation violates, even though she (rather cavalierly) finds the "metaphysical status" of "right-making features" (p. 47) dubious to meaningless.
In short, I think Annas is wrong to lend such little credence to theories of right action. Moreover, I'd say that she implies a deontic commitment to individual autonomy in her Roman slavery example. She’s right to do so, and ought to design an ethical theory that accounts for such an ethical judgment.